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FURTHER REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS ANGOLA VERIFICATION MISSION (UNAVEM II)

INTRODUCTION

1. This report responds to the final paragraph of the statement by the President of the Security Council at its meeting on 18 September 1992, in which he declared that "the Security Council will continue to keep the situation in Angola under close review and looks forward to a further report by the Secretary-General after the elections" (S/24573). It also provides the detailed report on the situation in Angola requested in paragraph 2 of Security Council resolution 785 (1992) of 30 October 1992, together with my recommendations on action to be taken by the Council before the current mandate of the United Nations Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM II) expires on 30 November 1992.

2. During the period since my last report of 9 September 1992 (S/24556), the peace process in Angola, as agreed in the Bicesse Accords of May 1991, should have reached its apogee with the holding of Angola's first multi-party elections and the installation of a democratically elected President and Government. For a few weeks this goal seemed within reach: logistical difficulties in organizing the elections on 29 and 30 September 1992 were overcome; fears that violence would mar the voting proved unfounded; and the Angolan people turned out calmly and en masse to fulfil their civic duty and demonstrate, unequivocally, their determination to achieve democracy and peace; in due time, after the necessary investigations, the United Nations declared the elections to have been generally free and fair, despite some deficiencies and irregularities. The expectations engendered by this remarkable performance were, however, short-lived. União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA) claimed massive and systematic fraud, left the newly formed Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and refused to accept the results of the elections. Violent incidents escalated during the following weeks, culminating in intensive fighting on the weekend of 31 October and 1 November, especially in Luanda. Neither side can be exclusively blamed or

completely exonerated for this disaster, which resulted in an untold number of dead and wounded. The main reason why UNITA's rejection of the election results had such terrible consequences was the failure of both sides to honour fully their obligations under the Peace Accords relating to the cantonment and demobilization of troops, the formation of the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA) and of a neutral police force, the effective control and custody of weapons, and the extension of central administration to the whole territory.

3. At the time of writing this report, a fragile new cease-fire has been brokered, and is being maintained, with the active involvement of UNAVEM II, which is making strenuous efforts to bring both parties back to the negotiating table, within the framework of the Peace Accords. Sadly, the original cease-fire has been seriously broken for the first time since the Accords were signed 18 months ago. Many of the achievements of those months have been shattered. The role of UNAVEM II, instead of coming to an end at this time as originally intended, will almost certainly have to be extended and amplified. One of the few hopeful signs at present is that both sides say they want this. The exact nature and duration of this new mandate, however, cannot be defined until dialogue is re-established between the two sides.

I. THE ELECTIONS AND THEIR AFTERMATH

4. The electoral campaign was conducted without major violence, although there were reports of intimidation by some political parties, notably UNITA and the Movimento Popular para a Libertação de Angola (MPLA), as well as difficulties of access to certain areas, particularly those controlled by UNITA. The 18 political parties which had presented candidates campaigned actively. There were complaints, especially from the smaller parties, about the continued existence of the Government and UNITA armies, the slow progress in demobilization and in forming the new Angolan Armed Forces, and lack of access to the Government-controlled radio and television, whose partiality was criticized. UNAVEM electoral observers monitored the campaign, contributed to civic education programmes and provided information on UNAVEM's role.

5. The daunting logistical problems, about which concern was expressed in my last report, were overcome to a remarkable degree. For this, tribute is due to the national electoral authorities, as well as to the international community's response to United Nations requests for support. The two major challenges were transport (particularly air support) and communications. By the date of the elections these requirements had been satisfied, and UNAVEM and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) organized the largest air support operation of this kind that the United Nations has ever mounted, consisting of 45 helicopters and 15 fixed-wing aircraft. These assets were used to deploy electoral teams, supplies and equipment to the more inaccessible polling stations, as well as to provide a communications network, fuel supply and so forth. With the help of Member States, extra teams of technicians and air traffic controllers were brought in to help organize this effort, to which UNAVEM's own 14 helicopters and 2 fixed-wing aircraft were also committed.

6. UNAVEM deployed 400 electoral observers in two-person teams for the observation and verification of the voting. They were of some 90 nationalities and included staff members from the United Nations system, observers contributed by Member States and UNAVEM's military and police observers who, with their knowledge of field conditions, were especially valuable in providing logistical support. Prior briefing and training were given at UNAVEM's Luanda headquarters on political, military, electoral and administrative matters, the role of the Mission, and the observers' tasks. The training included simulation exercises on voting procedures. Additional briefings in the observers' areas of deployment focused on the local situations.
7. The limited number of observers, as well as lack of transport resources, made it impossible for UNAVEM to visit all the nearly 6,000 polling stations. Operating largely as mobile teams, the observers therefore relied on sample observation. They covered all 18 provinces and most of the 164 municipalities, and visited about 4,000 polling stations in all, spending an average of 20 minutes at each, enough time to observe about four voters complete the process. The observers monitored the organization of the polling stations and the general conduct of the voting and completed in each place a standard form prepared by UNAVEM's Electoral Division.
8. On 1 October 1992, my Special Representative, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, issued an interim statement in which she noted that the great majority of the 4.83 million registered voters had cast their ballots in peaceful and orderly conditions, despite organisational and logistical difficulties, the majority of which had been overcome with good will and ingenuity. As during registration, the voters had shown extraordinary determination, patience and discipline, often waiting hours to cast their votes. She paid tribute to the dedication and hard work of all the Angolan electoral officials, including the President and members of the National Electoral Council, the Director-General and his staff, the members and staff of the provincial electoral councils and directorates and, most especially, to the selfless efforts of the electoral registration brigades and the thousands of people who had worked to make the voting possible: polling officers, electoral police and designated party representatives.
9. Among the logistical and organizational difficulties encountered were the late arrival of voting materials, inadequate lighting and shortages of food, water and blankets for polling officials, many of whom spent the night of 29 to 30 September at polling stations with the ballot boxes. Some polling stations had to suspend operations for several hours while awaiting the arrival of electoral kits, while others closed earlier than the official time (7 p.m.). In some cases, voting continued until the early hours of 1 October because of the late arrival of materials. In most areas the counting, which was supposed to start at 7 p.m. on 30 September, did not begin until the following day, because of inadequate lighting. UNAVEM assisted in transporting electoral materials and in distributing blankets, food and lamps (some of which it contributed directly) to polling stations, especially in the Luanda area. The World Food Programme, the United Nations Children's Fund

(UNICEF) and UNDP also made available, at short notice, food, blankets and lamps, as well as vehicles to transport them.

10. Observation of the counting presented special challenges given the limited number of observers at UNAVEM's disposal. As the Electoral Law required this to take place at each polling station, only a small fraction of them could be observed. Full observation of counting would have required the presence of observers from the beginning to the end of the process at each polling station, which would have meant an impracticably large number of observers. UNAVEM carried out its own "quick count" of the presidential election at a carefully selected sample of 166 polling stations, at which its observers remained throughout the count. The quick count again proved to be a most valuable aid to verification. The results (within 0.3 per cent of the final result for President dos Santos and within 2 per cent of that for Mr. Savimbi) turned out to be an accurate forecast of the final results and thereby contributed to the eventual United Nations judgement that there was no conclusive evidence of major, widespread or systematic fraud (see paragraph 20 below).

11. Counting and compiling the votes on a provincial and then nationwide basis, as well as investigating complaints about mistakes, irregularities and alleged fraud, was a massive task which began on 1 October 1992 and exceeded the eight days provided in the Electoral Law. This was understandable, given the vast size of Angola, its ravaged infrastructure, and the fact that these were the first general elections ever held there. The People's Assembly successively extended the deadline for announcing the final results until 17 October. But, during those 17 days, announcements of informal results by both the Government- and UNITA-controlled media gave a distorted picture and raised tension. For example, on 3 October, UNITA's Vorgan radio station announced that UNITA was winning in all 18 provinces; at the same time the Government-controlled media claimed overwhelming nationwide gains for MPLA.

12. Complaints by UNITA and six other parties of widespread, massive and systematic irregularities and fraud began on 3 October 1992. During the following critical days I urged Mr. Savimbi, by letter and in a number of telephone conversations, not to reject the election, pending investigation of his complaints, and emphasized the urgency of a meeting between him and President dos Santos. My Special Representative interceded successfully with President dos Santos on 9 October 1992 to obtain a delay in the final announcement of the results so that all complaints could be investigated. On the same day she flew to Huambo to meet Mr. Savimbi, who had moved there from Luanda soon after the elections. As a result of these efforts, more time was authorized and the National Electoral Council (NEC) established four investigative commissions, in whose work UNAVEM II actively assisted. NEC also sent similar commissions to all 18 provinces; here again, UNAVEM II assisted with transport and participated in the Commissions' work. The four Commissions dealt respectively with the consistency of polling records, security of ballot boxes, control of surplus electoral kits and supplementary polling stations. On 16 October 1992 NEC, in a meeting at which all legalized political parties were represented, announced that the investigations had not

revealed any conclusive evidence of fraud. I again intervened with Mr. Savimbi and urged him to accept the results.

13. Meanwhile, a major violation of the Peace Accords had occurred on 5 October 1992, when 11 former UNITA generals, including the commander of UNITA's army, General "Ben Ben", withdrew from the new, unified Angolan Armed Forces (FAA), in protest at what they called "fraud and cheating" in the elections. General "Ben Ben" had been sworn in as one of the two Joint Chiefs of General Staff of FAA just a week before, on 28 September 1992. On the previous day, only three days before the elections, the two former armies of FAPLA (Government) and FALA (UNITA) had been dissolved, and FAA created in their stead, thus completing one of the major requirements of the Bicesse Accords. This key move had itself been in doubt and depended on a personal meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi, which was not arranged until the last moment, following intervention by my Special Representative. Notwithstanding the moving solemnity of the swearing-in ceremony, it was more symbolic than real, since neither demobilization of the troops surplus to FAA's requirements, nor the formation of FAA itself had yet been completed. The fragility of these arrangements was demonstrated only too clearly by the withdrawal of the ex-FALA generals seven days later.

14. This action, together with the rising political and military tensions, led the Security Council to decide to send an ad hoc Commission to Angola to support implementation of the Peace Accords.

15. The ad hoc Commission, composed of representatives of Cape Verde, Morocco, the Russian Federation and the United States of America, visited Angola from 11 to 14 October 1992. Their arrival coincided with a bomb incident and armed clashes in Luanda. The Commission met with President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi (the latter in Huambo), as well as with the leaders of the two sides' delegations to the Joint Political and Military Commission (JPMC), high-ranking Government and UNITA officials, national electoral officials, representatives of major political parties, the representatives of the three observers on JPMC (Portugal, Russian Federation and United States of America) and Foreign Minister Botha of South Africa, who was in Luanda at that time.

16. During these meetings, and in the communiqué issued at the end of its visit, the Commission emphasized the importance of full implementation of the Peace Accords, including upholding the integrity of the electoral process, investigating all claims of irregularities and publishing the results. The Commission emphasized its concern over the recent increase in acts of violence as well as the need to resolve disagreements peacefully and to complete demobilization and the creation of the unified Angolan Armed Forces. It appealed to all parties, and to the Angolan people, to safeguard the peace, making it clear that any resumption of armed confrontation would meet with the strongest condemnation of the international community.

17. The Commission took note with satisfaction of the assurances given by President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi to take every possible step to avoid and

prevent violence, through dialogue and peaceful means, as well as of the good will shown regarding the possibility of forming a government of national unity.

18. The Commission emphasized the full and unequivocal support of the Security Council for the efforts of my Special Representative and UNAVEM II, which had been instrumental in assisting the implementation of the Peace Accords. The Commission urged all parties to continue to work with her in the days ahead. Subsequently, after the Commission had briefed the Security Council on 19 October 1992, the President made the statement issued as document S/24683.

19. On the morning of 17 October 1992, the President of NEC announced the official election results. More than 91 per cent of those registered had voted. In both the presidential and legislative contests there had been, unfortunately, very high numbers of blank and spoiled votes. MPLA had won the legislative elections, with 53.74 per cent of the votes, against UNITA's 34.1 per cent. In the presidential elections, President José Eduardo dos Santos had won 49.57 per cent, against Mr. Jonas Savimbi's 40.07 per cent; since neither had achieved 50 per cent, the Electoral Law required a second round.

20. Later the same day, my Special Representative issued a public statement declaring that, after considering all the facts, as well as the concerns and views expressed by all the Angolan parties and by other international observers:

"The United Nations considers that while there were certainly some irregularities in the electoral process, these appear to have been mainly due to human error and inexperience. There was no conclusive evidence of major, systematic or widespread fraud, or that the irregularities were of a magnitude to have a significant effect on the results officially announced on 17 October. Nor, in view of their random nature, could it be determined that such irregularities had penalized or benefited only one party or set of parties.

"I therefore have the honour, in my capacity as Special Representative of the Secretary-General, to certify that, with all deficiencies taken into account, the elections held on 29 and 30 September can be considered to have been generally free and fair. The United Nations urges all Angolans and all Angolan political leaders, as well as the international community, to respect and support the results of this stage of the electoral process. A further certification will be made after the second round of the Presidential election."

21. This statement was later supported by a number of Member States, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the European Community. However, as I have reported to the Security Council, the statement also led to a campaign by UNITA-controlled mass media impugning the integrity and impartiality of my Special Representative and of UNAVEM II. Death threats were made against Miss Anstee, and UNAVEM military, police and civilian staff were threatened in certain regions.

22. A solution to the dangerous political impasse which followed the election clearly depended on an early meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. But plans for this repeatedly fell through, despite numerous telephone conversations between myself and each of the two leaders, and parallel efforts by my Special Representative, the three observer States and others.

23. On 19 October 1992, the two parties agreed to establish two joint commissions (political and military) to prepare a meeting between the two leaders. At the same time, they expressed a wish for much greater involvement of the United Nations in the second round of the presidential election, both in numbers and in mandate. In a conversation on 8 October with the Angolan Minister for Foreign Affairs I had stressed that the Angolans must first help themselves if the international community was to maintain its support for the Angolan peace process; what was needed was urgent dialogue between the two leaders, early agreement on holding the second round of the presidential elections and strict compliance with the Peace Accords by both parties.

24. Notwithstanding all these national and international efforts, the political and military situation continued to deteriorate at an alarming rate. Major incidents included a bomb explosion and subsequent outbreak of shooting on 11 October outside the Hotel Turismo in Luanda where many UNITA personnel lived; the occupation by force, on 14 October, of Andulo in central Angola by UNITA soldiers; the explosion of a large ammunition dump, in close proximity to the UNAVEM headquarters in Luanda, which shook the capital for several hours during the night of 15 October; and serious fighting in Huambo on 17 and 18 October which UNAVEM was instrumental in bringing to a halt by negotiating a cease-fire, reinforced by the setting up of a Joint Commission.

25. Immediately after the results of the elections were announced on 17 October, increased movement of UNITA troops was reported in various parts of the country and UNITA launched a nationwide operation to occupy municipalities by force and remove the Government's administrative structures there. In some cases administrators were killed and in others they either fled or were evicted and forced to walk to the nearest towns still controlled by the Government.

26. On 27 October 1992 I wrote to the Security Council expressing serious concern at the rising tension. The Council once again (S/24720) called upon both parties to abide by all their commitments under the Peace Accords, in particular the confinement of their troops and collection of weapons, demobilization and the formation of the unified Angolan Armed Forces. It requested the parties to refrain from any act that might heighten tension, jeopardize the electoral process or threaten territorial integrity. It further requested UNITA to respect the results of the elections and urged the leaders of the two parties to engage in immediate dialogue to enable the second round of the presidential elections to be held; the Security Council would hold responsible any party which refused to take part in such a dialogue.

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27. Three days later, on 30 October 1992, the Security Council, faced with further alarming reports on the resumption of hostilities in many parts of the country, adopted resolution 785 (1992). This reiterated all of the above points and extended the existing mandate of UNAVEM II until 30 November 1992, by which date it requested the Secretary-General to submit a detailed report with long-term recommendations. The resolution also endorsed the statement by my Special Representative certifying that the elections were generally free and fair, reiterated its full support for her and for UNAVEM II, and strongly condemned the "attacks and baseless accusations" made against them by UNITA's radio station Vorgan.

28. Barely 24 hours later, on 31 October 1992, heavy fighting broke out between Government and UNITA forces in many parts of the country, especially in the major cities. It was most serious in the capital, where UNITA's Vice-President, Mr. Chitunda, and the leader of its JPMC delegation, Mr. Salupeto Pena, were killed. Several other UNITA leaders, including its Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Chivukuvuku, were wounded; they and others were put "under the protection of the Government", along with nine UNITA generals, more than a dozen other senior UNITA military and political officers and scores of civilian UNITA supporters.

29. The trouble had begun on the previous day, 30 October 1992, at Luanda airport, which the Government alleged that UNITA had attempted to seize. Fighting ensued between the Government's anti-riot police and UNITA forces, resulting in some casualties. Later, 12 civilians, including 3 Portuguese nationals, were killed in the Luanda suburb of Cassenga, allegedly by UNITA soldiers. The Government deployed police extensively throughout the city and set up road blocks.

30. On the morning of 31 October 1992, exchanges of fire continued on a smaller scale, though there was renewed firing at the airport around 0900 hours. Late that morning JPMC held an emergency meeting to discuss the escalating hostilities in Luanda and elsewhere. Both parties agreed to issue statements, calling on their forces to cease hostile activities forthwith throughout the country. They further agreed that the senior military representatives of both parties, together with those of the three observer countries and of UNAVEM II, should immediately visit the major trouble spots to ensure that this took place.

31. However, less than an hour after these decisions were adopted, at about 1400 hours, major clashes broke out in the capital, with the opposing forces using automatic rifles, rockets, mortars and rifle grenade launchers. Anti-riot police, regular police and armed civilians engaged the UNITA troops in the capital and its suburbs. The Government forces retained control of the airport. Heavy fighting took place outside Radio Nacional de Angola and at all UNITA residential areas and offices. In the city, the Hotel Turismo, which accommodated many UNITA soldiers and families, was also extensively damaged. There were fierce exchanges of fire at Mr. Savimbi's residence in the suburb of Miramar. A motel near the Presidential compound in Futungo, which was being used by UNITA soldiers, was attacked and overrun and in this

operation a tank and armoured personnel carriers (APCs) were used. Two MI-24 Hind armed helicopters assisted the Government police for at least two hours in the afternoon.

32. The violence continued on 1 November 1992. During the fighting, UNITA forces held a number of foreigners as hostages, including the Ambassador of Zimbabwe. A British and Bulgarian national were injured and fortunate to have survived while being forced to travel with UNITA leaders who were killed as they tried to escape. There are persistent reports that Government anti-riot police, as well as civilians armed by the Government, killed thousands of UNITA supporters in Luanda and other main cities, particularly Benguela and Malange, both before and after the cease-fire.

33. Throughout these difficult days I made constant efforts, in telephone calls to the two leaders and others and in public statements, to get the fighting stopped and a political dialogue restarted. With the help of Member States, I finally succeeded in obtaining agreement on a cease-fire which came officially into effect at 0001 hours on 2 November 1992.

34. However, fighting continued in Malange, Lobito, Cafunfo and Benguela. But by 3 November 1992, thanks to UNAVEM's efforts, joint Government/UNITA cease-fire commissions had been set up in all the regions except Luanda. UNITA nevertheless seized control of more municipalities, as well as the Capanda dam project in Cuanza Norte province. While the Government continued to hold the major cities and towns, UNITA controlled much of the countryside and effectively surrounded several cities. By 23 November 1992, 57 of the 164 municipalities in Angola had been confirmed by UNAVEM II as being under the control of UNITA, while a similar but unconfirmed state of affairs was reported to exist in 40 others. UNAVEM military, police and civilian electoral observers in some areas were caught in crossfire, but none was seriously harmed. In all regions, UNAVEM worked to maintain the cease-fire, patrolling trouble-spots and using its good offices to create communication and dialogue between the parties.

35. The Government later accused UNITA of having started the violence, alleging that it planned to take control of Luanda by force, and produced personal papers to that effect purportedly written by Mr. Chitunda, Mr. Salupeto Pena and Mr. Chivukuvuku. UNITA said that such allegations were false, as well as absurd from the military point of view; that its forces were in the capital only for the security of UNITA leaders; and that the Government had carried out a plan to ambush the latter and try to liquidate the party under the pretext of crushing an alleged coup d'état.

36. Meanwhile, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations agencies in Angola, with the help of UNAVEM, evacuated non-essential staff and dependants as did many embassies and foreign businesses. The evacuations were complicated by the closure of Luanda airport for several days and by the suspension of the few international flights serving Angola. UNAVEM II, having adopted a "last to leave" policy, kept its military, police and civilian presence intact at 67 locations throughout the country. However,

two of these (Cafunfo and Capanda) had to be abandoned after UNAVEM observers were forced out by UNITA.

37. Strenuous diplomatic efforts, assisted actively by the United Nations, have continued since the cease-fire to arrange a meeting between President dos Santos and Mr. Savimbi. A problem since the events of 31 October and 1 November is that UNITA's leadership has been depleted by the death or non-availability of several key figures. The UNITA personalities at the Defence Ministry in Luanda have not been authorized to negotiate on UNITA's behalf, while Mr. Savimbi and his senior colleagues in Huambo have genuine fears for their security. On the Government side, General Antonio dos Santos França "N'dalu" was appointed chief negotiator for consolidating the cease-fire and getting the peace process back on track, while retaining his posts as head of the Government's delegation to JPMC and as one of the two Joint Chiefs of General Staff of the new Angolan Armed Forces (FAA). The other FAA Joint Chief of General Staff, General "Ben Ben", was initially reported to have been killed during the fighting in Luanda but is now known to have survived. Another problem has been that distrust between the two sides has been exacerbated by the violence and killings that have taken place since the elections.

38. Immediately after the cease-fire the Government stipulated four conditions for restarting the political dialogue between the two leaders:

- (a) Commitment to uphold the cease-fire, pursue dialogue and renounce violence;
- (b) Commitment to the principles of the Peace Accords;
- (c) Acceptance of the results of the 29 and 30 September legislative elections;
- (d) Greater United Nations involvement in the peace process and the second round of the presidential election.

Negotiations on these conditions proceeded at a painfully slow pace, and mainly by telephone between Luanda and Huambo, with each side suspecting the other of using the relative calm to prepare further hostilities and with each remaining at a high level of military preparedness and alert.

39. On 5 November 1992, I sent Mr. Marrack Goulding, Under-Secretary-General for Peace-keeping Operations, to Angola to assist my Special Representative in her continuing efforts to help implement the cease-fire, put the peace process back on track and explore what the future role of UNAVEM might be. During the period from 6 to 12 November, Mr. Goulding and my Special Representative, accompanied on most occasions by the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Edward Unimna, had two audiences with President dos Santos and a three-and-a-half hour meeting with Mr. Savimbi on the outskirts of Huambo, as well as two long telephone conversations with him. There were also meetings with the Minister for External Relations, with the UNITA leaders at the Ministry of Defence and with the three observer countries.

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40. President dos Santos reiterated that his objective was to return to the military situation which existed immediately before the elections and to move out of the present impasse within the legal framework provided by the Electoral Law and the new Constitutional Law. To that end he intended to call a multi-party conference and convene the newly elected Parliament as soon as possible. On that basis, he would set up a government of national unity (in which UNITA would be invited to participate at all levels) for the transition period before the second round of presidential elections. This, the President envisaged, would last six to eight months in order to create the necessary conditions for holding the second presidential round. These were full demilitarization nationwide; the collection and custody of arms; the consolidation of FAA; and restoration of the Government's administration throughout the national territory. For this an enlarged UNAVEM presence, with a wider mandate, would be essential, including the deployment of armed troops.

41. The meeting with Mr. Savimbi took some time to arrange, partly because of his concerns about his security and partly because it was at first linked to certain concessions by the Government, to some of which my representatives lent support, but which the Government did not feel able to make at that stage. When the meeting eventually took place late on 10 November, Mr. Savimbi stressed a number of concerns, including his own security and that of his party and people; the increased mistrust and suspicion on both sides; the situation of senior UNITA personalities in Luanda; and his continuing belief that the elections had been fraudulent. At the same time, he reiterated his personal preference for peace and dialogue without, however, giving any detailed commitment as to when and how these ends might be pursued. He also reiterated his conviction that a much strengthened UNAVEM, including armed troops, was essential to create conditions suitable for holding the second round of elections.

42. My representatives concluded from these two conversations that the desire for a larger United Nations involvement constituted the main common ground between the two sides. It was possible to discern an emergent agreement that the United Nations could be asked for help with the following aspects of a restored peace process:

- (a) Mediation and good offices;
- (b) Reassembly and demobilization of troops;
- (c) Control and custody of weapons (including those in civilian hands);
- (d) Assistance with the formation and training of FAA;
- (e) Assistance with the formation of a unified police force;
- (f) Assistance in resolving the problem of security for senior UNITA officials;
- (g) Assisting and observing the second round of elections.

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43. When the question of a larger United Nations role was pursued in the second meeting with President dos Santos, he stated his agreement in principle but was unwilling to discuss details until Mr. Savimbi formally accepted the results of the legislative elections. As a result of a telephone conversation and an exchange of letters with Mr. Goulding, Mr. Savimbi confirmed, in a letter dated 17 November 1992, that the Permanent Committee of UNITA's Political Commission had met in Huambo on 15 and 16 November, and had concluded that UNITA accepted the results of the "recognizedly fraudulent and irregular" legislative elections so as to permit the implementation of the peace process. UNITA believed it was of utmost importance that the United Nations be increasingly involved in the process and made specific proposals for such involvement.

44. The United Nations immediately made clear to Mr. Savimbi that while it was gratified to note UNITA's decision to accept the results of the legislative elections, it did not accept the Permanent Committee's characterization of those elections as "reconhecimentos fraudulentos e irregulares", which it regarded as a unilateral interpretation by UNITA. It was also emphasized that the United Nations could not assume responsibility for guaranteeing the security of UNITA leaders, members and installations; it could, however, provide assistance through various arrangements which had been successfully applied in similar situations elsewhere.

45. UNITA's written acceptance of the results of the legislative elections, which my Special Representative conveyed to President dos Santos in a further meeting on 12 November, marks a significant step forward. So far, however, no meeting between representatives of the two sides has taken place since the JPMC meeting of 31 October. In all their contacts, my representatives have stressed the urgency of agreement between the two sides on the detailed future requirements for UNAVEM. They have also emphasized that no commitment can be made until the Security Council approves a recommendation presented by the Secretary-General and that the prerequisite for this is an official request from the Government of Angola, based on consensus between the two parties to the Peace Accords. They have also pointed out that some of the functions envisaged for UNAVEM II are at present entrusted to others.

46. Meanwhile, the Government has continued with its plans to convene the newly elected Assembly and form a new government of national unity and reconciliation. A conference was held, under the President's chairmanship, on 21 November. All the parties that had won seats in the new parliament were invited to participate, with other parties being represented by observers. UNITA did not send a delegation because of concern over their security, although the Special Representative offered to arrange for them to be transported to Luanda in a UNAVEM plane and to be accompanied at all times by United Nations military and police observers and security guards.

II. ACTIVITIES, STRENGTH AND DEPLOYMENT OF UNAVEM II

47. It will be evident from the preceding section of this report that since the elections UNAVEM II has undertaken a number of tasks which extend beyond its original mandate. That mandate was, first, to verify the functioning of the joint machinery set up by the two sides to monitor the military and police aspects of the Bicesse Accords and, secondly, to observe the elections. In recent weeks, UNAVEM II has in addition been called upon to act as mediator and use its good offices to help the parties agree on arrangements to consolidate the cease-fire and set the peace process back on course. This role has been welcomed by the two sides, as is reflected in their common view that the United Nations should play an even larger role in future in helping create conditions for a second round of the presidential elections.

48. UNAVEM II's activities in connection with the elections have been fully described in the preceding section of this report.

49. As regards its mandate in military matters, UNAVEM II continued to carry out its verification functions at the assembly areas up to and after the formal disbandment of FAPLA and FALA on 27 September 1992. As the elections drew near, demobilization accelerated. By 7 October 1992, a total of 96,620 Government troops had been demobilized, representing 80 per cent of the projected figure. However, a much lower proportion of ex-FALA troops were demobilized and even then they did not leave their assembly areas. Almost all seem since to have been remobilized.

50. Weapons continue to be stockpiled by UNITA and Government forces and some progress has been made, even in the disturbed conditions since the elections, in transporting weapons and ammunition from the assembly areas to designated central storage areas. Some of the latter are guarded by troops of FAA and others by troops loyal to one side or the other. At least 11 ex-FAPLA ammunition depots have been destroyed, probably as a result of sabotage. Another major problem is the vast quantities of weapons which remain in private hands and which can easily be purchased in local markets. The number of such weapons increased as a result of the Government's distribution of arms to its civilian supporters, many of them reportedly demobilized FAPLA troops, at the end of October.

51. Meanwhile, United Nations police observers continued their verification of police neutrality, albeit with difficulty, the joint monitoring groups being still almost entirely dependent on UNAVEM for transport and communications. Soon after the elections, UNITA withdrew their cooperation. UNAVEM police observers are currently participating in the joint cease-fire monitoring commissions in all regions. Little progress has been made in developing a representative national police force. By the time of the elections, 642 UNITA elements had been trained and incorporated but, with UNITA's departure from FAA, most of the UNITA elements withdrew also from the police. As at 22 November 1992, no UNITA members were undergoing police training.

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52. During recent weeks UNAVEM II personnel have continued to face threats and harassment from partisans of both sides. Mr. Savimbi has repeatedly apologized for the earlier attacks on the Special Representative by Vorgan radio and the newspaper Terra Angolana, which he avers do not represent UNITA's official view, and has issued a communiqué enjoining all UNITA forces and followers to provide "friendly cooperation and support for UNAVEM". In the first two weeks of November, however, UNAVEM helicopters were shot at by UNITA forces on three occasions and a number of UNAVEM's military and police patrols were denied freedom of movement on roads controlled by UNITA. There have also been threats and interference from Government personnel, partly perhaps as a result of earlier Government criticism of UNAVEM's alleged partiality towards UNITA. Mr. Goulding and my Special Representative have forcefully emphasized to both leaders the imperative need for all such incidents to cease forthwith if UNAVEM II's mandate is to be extended.

53. During the recent disturbances, my Special Representative and I have been increasingly concerned about the security of UNAVEM II's military, police and electoral personnel, all of whom are unarmed. In the cities they have often had to brave the crossfire as they try to negotiate local cease-fires, and many have found themselves caught up unwittingly in violent incidents. In the countryside they remain deployed at all but 2 of the 67 assembly areas and critical points, many of them isolated and in some cases largely abandoned by the troops who were previously there. The hazards have been increased by the fact that the numbers of military and police observers have fallen sharply, with the result that in almost all assembly areas the UNAVEM II teams now consist of only two military observers.

54. At a time when it is facing new and greater tasks, UNAVEM II's strength has fallen to 210 military observers and 77 police observers, compared with authorized strengths of 350 and 126 respectively. This is because most observers' tours of duty were scheduled to end at the end of October 1992, by which date it was expected that the mission's mandate would terminate. When it became clear that this was not to be the case, I asked the contributing Governments either to replace the personnel concerned or to extend their tours of duty by three months, during which period it was hoped that the situation would clarify. Not all Governments have yet responded positively to this request. My recommendations on this matter are contained in paragraph 61 below.

55. Meanwhile, a detailed UNAVEM Security Plan has been issued and all personnel have been briefed on it. As regards possible evacuation, UNAVEM II is responsible for all United Nations personnel up-country and the Mission works closely with United Nations agencies in Luanda. Various evacuation options have been identified. UNAVEM II remains on Phase One of security, with all staff being considered essential and required to remain in Angola. During the recent hostilities, UNAVEM organized, coordinated or assisted the evacuation of UNDP and other United Nations agency dependants and non-essential staff from Luanda and from outstations elsewhere in Angola.

III. OBSERVATIONS

56. As will be sadly clear from this report, the situation in Angola has undergone a catastrophic deterioration since I last reported to the Council less than 11 weeks ago. The successful completion of the peace process and the establishment of multi-party democracy now seem farther off than at any time since before the Peace Accords were signed in May 1991. This is a cruel set-back for the long-suffering people of Angola, who showed, by their exemplary participation in the elections, how much they yearn for peace, democracy and a better life. It is also a major disappointment for the international community and the United Nations, which have invested so much effort and resources in support of the peace process.

57. It is too soon to attempt a detailed examination of what went wrong. But it is already clear that a root cause was the incomplete fulfilment, within an admittedly tight timetable, of key provisions in the Peace Accords which were intended to create the conditions for elections to be held. Foremost amongst these failings were the less than effective demobilization and storage of weapons; the delay in creation of the unified Armed Forces which did not come into being, and then only formally, until a few days before the elections; the failure to re-establish effective central administration in many parts of the country; and the dilatoriness in setting up a neutral police force. A less tangible, but equally influential, factor was the difficulty of creating in 16 months, after as many years of bitter civil war, an atmosphere of mutual confidence, tolerance and respect. Above all, there was a lack of understanding of the changes in attitudes and concepts, not just in formal structures and arrangements, which are needed for multi-party democracy to be successfully introduced.

58. But it is also too soon to despair of the Angolan peace process, nor do I detect any tendency on the part of the international community to do so. It is true that the cease-fire of 1 November is barely holding and both sides have undertaken preparations for renewed war. But both have also reiterated their commitment to peace and dialogue and both have expressed a wish that the international community should help them translate those words into deeds. Most importantly, perhaps, both are agreed on the need for an enlarged UNAVEM presence in order to create, over a period of six months or so, conditions in which the second round of presidential elections can take place and the peace process be brought to a successful conclusion. This creates common ground on which I and my representatives are trying to build in our continuing contacts with both sides.

59. In those contacts, however, I am making very clear that I would not be prepared to recommend an enlargement of UNAVEM's mandate and strength, or even its continuation at its present strength, unless both sides can convince me that this time they will be genuine in their adherence to, and fulfilment of, the Peace Accords, especially their key provisions relating to the dissolution of the existing armies and the creation of unified and non-partisan military and police forces. It would also be necessary for the parties to agree on a clear timetable and on formal evaluation at regular intervals of their

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fulfilment of their commitments. There has to be evidence of a genuine commitment to national reconciliation. This cannot be achieved without the full participation of UNITA, the second largest party in the elected Assembly, whose legitimate concerns must be addressed. There is a need for good will gestures on both sides. I have especially urged the Government to release the UNITA personalities held in Luanda and have received support in this regard from certain heads of State and Government. I have also made it very clear to both parties that they should not take the international community for granted. Unless they show a greater willingness than in the past to work together to establish peace in their country, the scarce resources available for peacemaking and peace-keeping will be diverted elsewhere.

60. It is not possible to say at this time whether my efforts and those of interested Member States will succeed in persuading the Government and UNITA to reactivate the peace process and put behind them the errors and tragedies of recent weeks. I am not yet therefore in a position to provide the Security Council with the long-term recommendations requested in paragraph 2 of resolution 785 (1992). I accordingly recommend that the Council decide to extend UNAVEM II, with its existing mandate, for a further period of two months, that is until 31 January 1993. Before that date I would submit a further report containing my recommendations on the future involvement of the United Nations in the Angolan peace process. If this recommendation is approved, the Security Council might wish at the same time to make clear to the parties that the international community cannot wait indefinitely for them to take the difficult decisions required of them if the peace process is to be put back on track.

61. Meanwhile I propose to take urgent steps, with the cooperation of the Member States concerned, to restore UNAVEM II's strength of military and police observers to its authorized levels. This would be both a token of the international community's continuing commitment to the Angolan peace process and a practical measure to improve the security of UNAVEM's personnel in the field and to strengthen their ability to consolidate the cease-fire.

62. In conclusion, I would like to record that during my efforts in recent weeks to persuade the two sides to fulfil their commitments and work together to restore the peace process, I frequently sought the help of the heads of State and Government and the Foreign Ministers of several Member States. I take this opportunity to express my gratitude for the support which they so willingly gave me, often at very unsocial hours, and for their contribution to the United Nations endeavours to restore peace in Angola.

63. I also pay tribute to my Special Representative, Miss Margaret Joan Anstee, to the Chief Military Observer, Major-General Edward Ushie Unimna, and to all the military, police and other civilian personnel of UNAVEM II, for the loyal, courageous and resourceful way in which they have continued to carry out their duties in dangerous and distressing

circumstances. At times it must have seemed to them that all their efforts of the last year or more were about to come to nought. But if the peace process can be saved, it will, to an important extent, be because of their determination and devotion to duty in recent weeks.
